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language, handicap, age, veteran status  or sexual orientation.THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DRAFT USER FEES
INTRODUCTION
U.S.  competitiveness in world markets  requires an efficient port
system capable  of responding to  shifts  in worldwide shipping demands.  In
the past, local ports  and the federal government have shared responsibility
for the maintenance and development of U.S. harbors and navigable channels
to meet these demands.  Local port authorities, state agencies and/or  the
private sector have tended to assume responsibility for developing and
operating marine terminal facilities while the federal government through
the Army Corps of Engineers developed, operated, and maintained ports and
navigable channels on a cost free basis.  The availability utilization of
national ports and harbors on a cost free basis benefitted the waterborne
freight industry and enhanced its economic position relative  to other
transport modes.
Major policy debates  in the early 1980's focused on U.S. ports and
their adequacy to  meet the nation's present and future needs.  After five
years of debate, in November 1986,  Congress passed the Waterway Resources
Act of 1986.  This  established a  .04 percent ad valorem tax on all cargo
passing through the port system.  The U.S. Customs  Service implemented this
tax  in April 1987.  The  act is causing fundamental changes  in the
traditional relationship between the federal government and the water
freight industry.
This policy change to user fees  to help share the costs of operation
and maintenance of U.S. harbors and navigable channels is  a highly debated
and controversial issue.  The specific legislation changing how the
nation's ports  are maintained and operated represents  an initiative  todevelop a definitive U.S. port policy which is more equitable and
efficient.
This paper will briefly present the history of the U.S.  port policy
and the role  of the Army Corps of Engineers.  The major part of this paper
will discuss  the economic rationale for levying a user fee and the
legislative impetus behind the recently enacted user fee scheme for U.S.
harbors and navigable channels.  The relationship between the public and
private interests will be explored by presenting both opponent and
proponent viewpoints of  the user fee debate.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:  U.S. PORT POLICY AND THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
The evolution of the U.S. port policy system demonstrates the  lack of
a consistent, long-term national port policy.  Although the U.S.  has a long
history of federal participation in transportation matters, U.S. national
port policy can essentially be thought of as a social contract between the
federal government and the ports.
This  social contract predates  the Civil War and has constitutional
precedent.  Prior to  1824, state and local agencies generally paid for
river and harbor improvement through congressional authorization to  levy
tonnage duties  on local shipping.  Direct federal  involvement in the
maintenance and construction of ports was  initiated in 1824 by the General
Survey Act.  Congress made  its first appropriations  for river and harbor
improvements within the  same year.  The need for a national planning
organization for river and harbor management and maintenance was apparent.
The Army Corps of Engineers was originally advocated by President James
Monroe because of its  technical and engineering expertise.  Congress,
however, rejected the  idea of having an executive  agency like the Corps
2take national responsibility  for harbor and river project planning.
Congress thus  established a pattern of authorizing and funding port
projects  for the  Corps on a case by case basis that continued for 150
years.  As the Marine Board stated:
"...despite  general agreement on the need for national projects,
Congress  after 1838 never reached a consensus  on the scope of the
rivers and harbors  improvements,  the appropriate criteria for
distinguishing between national and local projects,  and the exact
constitutional basis of its power to appropriate funds for these
improvements...  Simply stated, the basic framework of
relationships  and issues  among the Corps,  Congress,  the
President, and local and national interests was established prior
to  the Civil War and survives in a surprisingly recognizable
fashion today."  (Marine Board, 1983, p. 7)
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND CONGRESS
The Army Corps of Engineers today has responsibility for  the
construction and maintenance of ports and channels in addition to  its
function of port development.  The Corps'  specific responsibilities  are
twofold.  One,  the Corps fixes harbor area lines and establishes the limits
to which wharves, piers  and other works can extend into navigable waters by
requiring federal permits.  Two,  the  Corps  grants permits  for the use and
occupation of federal works under jurisdiction of  the Corps.  The  Corps
provides operation and maintenance services without reimbursement,
essentially financed by the taxpayer from the U.S.  Treasury.
Port projects are approved by  independent Congressional actions  on an
annual project specific basis.  As noted earlier, this  special budgetary
relationship between the  Corps  and Congress has existed for over  150 years.
The Army Corps  essentially follows  Congressional mandates, with  the
President having only limited control over these activities.
3The Army Corps of Engineers  is  the only major federal executive
agency currently receiving year-to-year funding appropriations  for multi-
year construction projects.  The usual funding approach used for most
federal executive agencies  for major construction projects on the federal
level  is  full  funding.  The  full funding type of appropriation puts  the
entire cost of a construction project in a single annual budget.  Full
funding enables  the executive agencies to  exercise more authority and
greater discretion to  reapportion funds  independently of Congress.  On the
other hand, project specific, annual funding results  in a tight budget
relationship between the Corps and Congress.  It also provides the Corps
great independence from the normal executive budget decision-making
process.
Congress benefits from the annual project specific funding  in two
ways.  First,  "year-to-year" funding  tends  to conceal  the long-run effects
of budgetary decisions.  It had been estimated that as much as  95  percent
of the Corps' budget represents cumulative spending obligation"  (Marine
Board, 1983, p. 8).  Second, the funding approach used to make  the
appropriations  to  the Corps  leaves detailed control  of the funding process
in the hands of Congress.  Thus,  individual Congressional representatives
and senators can exercise much control over  the success of specific
projects.  Because many projects  are initiated on a local level by
individual congressional representatives,  the success of a particular port
project depends on the capability of the specific representative to
negotiate with his/her peers  in a vote trading process  for each other's
projects called logrolling.  "Individual ports thus develop tight links
both to  the local Corps  districts and to  their Congressional
4representatives  in promoting new construction.  These represent
micropolitical  systems organized around individual ports"  (Marine Board, et
al.,  1985,  p. 21).  Thus,  the Corps  implements river and harbor
improvements  that are not developed within the context of a long-range,
internodal transportation plan, but out of the logrolling capabilities of
individual representatives and the  subsequent pork barrel tradeoffs  for
site specific projects.
The  special relationship between the Corps  and Congress has been
criticized for almost as  long as the relationship has existed.  There are
three main criticisms of this  relationship which are also  crucial elements
in understanding the policy debate surrounding the user fee  issue.  First,
the annual, project-specific  funding system used by Congress  for the Corps'
projects depends on extensive  logrolling among many interests.  This
process essentially eliminates executive control over the Corps' budget.
As a result,  the executive branch  is limited to  using arguments  such as
budget shortfalls or  funding shortages for leverage to  assert control over
Corps appropriations.
The second criticism is  the lack of a national plan for ports.  The
system makes no  distinction between ports  of national or local value.  The
Congress,  the Executive and the Corps have traditionally failed to reach a
consensus  on a national port policy.  The third criticism concerns the
relationship between individual ports and Congress.  For many Congressional
representatives initiating and subsequently passing a new waterway project
is direct and physical evidence  that they are working for their
constituencies  in their respective  local districts.  These relationships
reflect the sectional  favoritism and lexicographic preferences of
5Congressional representatives.  Furthermore, the direct relationship that
individual ports maintain with  the Corps and Congress  through adept
lobbying efforts seems  to result  in funds for projects which cannot be
justified economically.
WHY LEVY USER FEES ?
Every administration since Franklin Roosevelt has advocated some  type
of port user fee  in order to pay for the operation and maintenance  services
the Army Corps of Engineers provides.  Why then was  the user fee first
enacted under  the Reagan Administration?
The reasons  for the implementation of a user fee during the 1980's
under Reagan are both economic and political in nature.  These reasons
represent the culmination of political and economic changes  in the U.S.
that forced the development of the first definitive executive stance on the
user fee  issue.
One reason is  the changing role of the U.S.  in the world economy.
Foreign commerce increased at an average annual rate of 3.9 percent between
1972 and 1981.  At the same time,  total cargo  (both foreign and domestic),
passing through the port system increased at an average annual rate of 3.2
percent.  Total shipping tonnage  through the ports has risen at an annual
rate of approximately 3 to 4 percent since 1978.  (Congressional Budget
Office, 1983,  p. 22).  The character of U.S.  imports and exports has also
changed over the last  twenty years.  This change can  explain in part the
annual tonnage  increases passing through the port system.  In the 1950s and
60s,  the U.S. was a major exporter of mass produced industrial goods.  Now
U.S. exports have come  to be dominated by bulk commodities such as coal  and
grains  (which require specialized terminals) and by highly technical goods
6like computers which are shipped in containers and bypass traditional port
terminals.  In response  to  the accelerating oil prices of the  1970's,
nations began to seek alternative energy sources.  The U.S.  provided an
energy substitute with  its large and readily available coal reserves.  This
resulted in a short-lived coal export boom during 1980  to  1982 which put
great pressure on U.S.  coal ports.
Thus,  as  shipping activity increased through U.S. ports, pressure on
the federal  government to provide deeper and improved navigable channels
and ports  increased.  The changing nature of U.S. international  trade
showed an increasing need for deep draft ports  that could accommodate
larger ships  carrying coal and grain exports.
The  Corps received a number of structural shocks during the early
1970's which contributed to  a virtual standstill in Corps  funding and new
project allocations.  Congress was no longer able  to reach decisions  on
major new waterway projects.  The factors contributing to  this  impasse can
be summarized as  follows.
The  Corps experienced a fundamental change in its  structural
environment during the  1970's  due to heightened public concern with the
environmental consequences of Corps activities  such as maintenance
dredging.  Congress passed several pieces of legislation mandating a number
of federal agencies  to  initiate and enforce environmental regulatory
programs.  This resulted in a complex new system of permits and mandated
the Corps to  complete assessment studies describing the environmental
consequences of their proposed port projects.  Furthermore, citizen groups,
federal agencies and others lobbying for environmental concerns became
active participants in the port project decision-making process.
7Discretionary federal funding became the subject of intense  scrutiny
during the  same time period.  Public concern over the  increasing deficit
grew.  Public  expectations for the amount of governmental services  exceeded
the fiscal capacity of the government to meet those expectations.  The
result was essentially a stalemate in Corps funding.  The funding
stalemate, more complex operation and maintenance regulations, and
tightened federal expenditures combined to create  15-  to 20-year-long
delays  in the actual  implementation of harbor dredging or new construction
programs.  Thus, by the  1980's,  the project specific, year-to-year  funding
approach combined with the lack of a national port policy  left the U.S.
with no established framework for prioritizing public works projects as  to
national or local value.
The Reagan Administration initiated legislation establishing a port
user fee system early in its  first term.  The Administration believed that
additional port capacity was essential  to U.S. economic well-being.  At the
same time,  the Administration was seeking to  reduce its  governmental role
in the economy with the significant exception of national defense.  Thus,
the  "rationale behind the Reagan Administration's  initial push for a user
fee proposal was that it would allow nationally important port
construction to be undertaken, and ensure equity and efficiency.  That is,
those who benefit pay, thus  equity is  achieved;  only those projects that
can pay their own way are carried out, thus  efficiency is  achieved" (Marine
Board, et al.,  1985,  p. 23).
DEFINITION OF A USER FEE
A user fee  is a form of payment required from a particular  individual
or group  in return for services provided.  They are a means by which
8governments can raise revenue by directly linking the cost of a public good
or service with  its beneficiaries.  User fees  are not new in concept or
application.  Hunting licenses, postage stamps and building permits  are  all
types of user fees.  Government at all levels  in the U.S. have made a
broad base move towards  the establishment of user fees  in the  face of
growing budget and fiscal uncertainty.
User fees have played a substantial role  in the transportation
industry.  User fees provided almost one half of the $23.3  billion spent by
the federal government on transportation during 1982  (Marine Board, et al.,
1985,  p. 65).  An excise  tax provides revenues  for the Highway Trust Fund.
A fuel  tax levied on barge operators has been providing revenues  from the
Inland Waterway Trust Fund since 1980.  Taxes on passenger tickets and
other items provide revenues for the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.  All of
these  taxes are  forms of user fees and aid in recovery of the federal cost
of subsidizing the specific programs.  Until the recent passage of an ad
valorem tax on cargo movements, the federal government provided a 100
percent subsidy to deep-draft port and harbor operation and maintenance.
In the context  of this paper, we can define a user fee by first
identifying the direct beneficiaries of the public service:  cargo
shippers.  The public service provided is operation and maintenance of deep
draft ports  and harbors by the Army Corps.  U.S. Treasury revenues are  the
sole source of support for the services  such as  dredging which the Corps
provides.  The  federal government has traditionally assumed 100 percent of
the program cost responsibility.  Therefore,  a user fee established to pay
for deep  draft port operation and maintenance would tax the cargo shipping
industry in order to  recover a certain percentage of program costs.
9ECONOMICS OF USER FEES
User fees theoretically enhance  the equity and efficiency of
providing a service.  User fees can be considered a unit price for a
government good.  Those who benefit directly from the provision of the
public service pay a total price based on their consumption, while those
who receive no direct benefit from provision of the good do not pay.
ADVANTAGES OF USER FEES
This  section will discuss some of the  theoretical claims as  to the
advantages of user fees.  Broadly stated there are three distinct
advantages:  (1) increased economic  equity;  (2) increased economic
efficiency;  and,  (3)  a source of cost recovery reducing the need for
subsidy from general revenues.
In theory, user fees are equitable  in that  the financial burden of a
special interest program is  shifted from the  taxpayer to those who benefit
directly from the subsidized program.  In practice, however,  the equity
formula should take into account the beneficiary's ability to pay.
Furthermore, economic efficiency is  also advocated as an advantage of a
user fee  system.  User fees provide  the public sector with a market
environment in which to make allocation decisions.  Thus, when marginal
cost  is equated with marginal benefits,  economic efficiency exists.
The Marine Board in 1983  also postulated some additional theoretical
claims as  to  the advantages  of implementing a user fee scheme which deserve
some emphasis.  Consider the claims  that user fees reduce rent-seeking
behavior, improve public sector  investments and reduce  tax burdens.  First,
reducing rent-seeking behavior  through public prices for Corps  services
10decreases  the wasteful diversion of resources.  For example, the amount of
time and money invested in lobbying efforts used to  influence politicians
and gain their approval for new projects would be reduced.  In other words,
as soon as cargo  shippers have to carry some of the cost burden, resource
waste decreases.  Second, prices which are based on fullcosts reduce the
pressures for unnecessarily expanding government services and in turn
improve public sector decision making and finance.  Third, tax burdens are
reduced.  A user fee scheme shifts  the cost of the  programs from the
general taxpayer to  the direct beneficiaries.  Thus, the  implementation of
user fees  enables more general tax dollars to be utilized for financing
more widely valued government services  such as  transfer payment programs
(Marine Board, 1983,  p. 19).
There are of course more practical matters  to be considered when
discussing the implementation of a user fee scheme.  In practice,
theoretical claims  as  to  the advantages of user fees are  subject to
political,  technical and financial realities.  These realities  serve as
constraints which hinder the practical application and establishment of a
user fee scheme.
ISSUES IN APPLICATION OF PORT USER FEES
Port interests  in the early 1980's  realized that some type of port
user fees scheme was  inevitable  given the Reagan Administration's  push for
reduced federal deficits and reduction of the role of the federal
government in the U.S.  economy.  Thus  the question was no  longer whether or
not user fees would be  implemented, but rather what type of user fee scheme
would be utilized.
11In practice, establishing systems which achieve  the stated
benefits of user fees has  turned out to be extremely difficult.
In the case of port dredging, some  interests  simply reject the
notion that standards  such as  efficiency and equity should be
applied.  Quite clearly, efficiency and equity standards applied
in any pure  form would have the result of closing certain ports.
Where user fees  threaten the existence  of a port, efficiency and
equity arguments have little appeal  (Marine Board, et al.,  1985,
p. 66).
There are many issues which complicate the implementation of a user
fee plan.  Simplistic  arguments of efficiency and equity most often do not
hold in the real world.  The more pragmatic questions regarding user fees
must be answered utilizing political, technical and financial complications
as foundations  for the decision making process.
Should the fee system be port specific or a nation-wide uniform fee?
How will smaller ports fare versus larger ports?  Who are  the direct
beneficiaries of deep draft port operation and maintenance?  The  above are
but a few of the questions a user fee scheme must answer in its
implementation.  A brief discussion of  these  issues  is  summarized below.
The beginning of this  discussion emphasizes  the inherent physical
characteristics of U.S. ports and navigable channels.  Some ports have a
natural deep draft advantage and require  less maintenance than others.  For
these ports, any kind of user fee  is opposed, but in particular, a
nationwide, uniform user fee.  In effect, ports with lower operation and
maintenance costs do not want to  subsidize high cost ports.  Furthermore, a
nationally uniform fee would not fully justify the basic rationale behind
user fees which implies  that those who benefit from the public service
should pay for that service.
Port specific fees would seem to be the most equitable and efficient.
Ports which have low maintenance cost and high volume would not have  to
12subsidize high maintenance cost, low volume ports.  The costs  for dredging
and other maintenance would be directly apportioned to actual usage
amounts.  However, a port specific  fee scheme might create a substantial
trade diversion from low volume, high cost ports to high volume,  lower cost
ports.  This  trade diversion would occur as shippers and the private sector
would shift their waterborne traffic to  the  lower cost ports which would
probably be high-volume ports.  Larger volume, low-cost ports would pay
lower user fees  due to  the lower actual cargo costs than smaller, low
volume ports.  Thus, the  cost of shipping through large ports would
eventually undercut the  smaller ports  shipping cost even more than they do
now.  Subsequently, specific ports  and their respective hinterlands would
suffer from trade losses  and port closings as  the consequences of market
forces unfold.
Thus, port-specific fees would seem to be politically impossible to
implement due  to  the close ties  maintained between local ports, their
respective Congressional representatives and Congress as  a whole.  Ports
can have influence beyond the standards of efficiency and equity, even
beyond their national economic contribution.  In other words, ports can
have influence through the strengths and weaknesses of the individual
representatives in Congress.
The question of who directly benefits and in turn who should pay the
user fees must also be addressed.  Cargo shippers  are most obviously the
direct beneficiaries of port dredging.  But are they  the only beneficiaries
of port maintenance?  The answer  is  no.  Foreign customers benefit from
harbor subsidies.  The user fee concept  is centered around the
identification of the users of a publicly provided service.  Shipping
13interests are  charged for dredging,  while in actuality there are many other
beneficiaries.  For example, some studies have shown that railroads,  coal
exporters and businesses in mining regions are also beneficiaries  of deep
draft harbor maintenance.  Other economic analyses suggest  that regional
economies may benefit from deeper ports due  to multiplier effects generated
by an efficient port system capable of servicing greater numbers of large
carriers.  Therefore, identifying only one  group of direct beneficiaries
for port maintenance  is extremely difficult in an interdependent and
complex economy like that of the U.S.
MOST RECENT LEGISLATION
The 99th Congress passed into law the Waterways Resources Development
Act (H.R. 6) in November 1986.  The passage  of this  act was  the product of
more than four years  of divisive debate, with significant input from the
Reagan Administration and considerable negotiation between the House of
Representatives  and the Senate.  The user fee scheme was  the subject of
more than twelve proposed bills  in both the House and Senate  in the 97th
Congress  alone.  Thus the passage of H.R. 6 represents a significant
compromise between all  interests involved and is  the first major waterways
legislation to be enacted in over  15 years.  Michael Strachn, Chief of  the
Legislation Coordination Branch of  the Army Corps of Engineers made the
following statement  in October 1986 during a presentation to the
Transportation and Competitiveness Symposium sponsored by the USDA-ERS:
"H.R. 6 creates  a new partnership between the Federal
Government and the port community in the area of paying for
future port construction and continued operation and maintenance
of port channels.  Whereas  in the past the government has assumed
most of the cost of new port development, H.R. 6 recognizes  that
this  approach simply cannot continue in view of budgetary
14constraints  and the  growing consensus that those who benefit from
Federal projects  should help pay for them."
H.R. 6 is a comprehensive piece of legislation which significantly
alters the manner in which harbor and waterway projects are  funded.  The
$16.3 billion, five-year package  includes the  imposition of a port user fee
and creates new cost-sharing provisions with local  interest which will
decrease federal outlays for harbor maintenance and new projects.  The  act
authorizes $16 billion for more than 300 projects--including 43 harbor
projects  and seven inland waterway projects.  Government funding would only
provide $9 billion of the authorization.  The $7 billion difference will be
accounted for through cost-sharing provisions and user fees  (Waster, 1986,
p. 10).
The cost-sharing formulas  and the established  .04 percent ad valorem
port user fee deserve  special emphasis within the context of this paper.
Although the legislation addressed every aspect of  the Corps water
resources program from flood control and hydroelectrical power to
commercial navigation, only the above mentioned cost-sharing formulas and
the port user fee will be explored.  The  cost-sharing provision of the  act
requires  that local interests  and the private sector develop a partnership
with the Federal Government.  This partnership  is based on new cost-sharing
rules  in which the future costs  of harbor, port and waterway construction
projects are  shared.  These  future costs are based on the port depth of
individual new projects.  The cost-sharing provisions require non-Federal
interests  to  pay for new port construction based on formulas as  summarized
below.
Ports and/or local interests  are required to pay a fixed percentage of
the construction costs for new harbor projects under the bill.  These costs
15are based on incremental project depth:  10 percent for channels  and ports
with depths up  to  20 feet;  25 percent for depths between 20 and 45  feet;
and 50 percent for depth greater than 45 feet.  These provisions apply to
ports in which a construction contract had not been granted before enacting
the law.  Furthermore, over a period of up to  30 years, an additional 10
percent of the cost of navigation facilities must be paid.  The repayment
would be reduced by the amount of expenditures on all utilities relocations
paid by local ports  (Strachn, 1986, p. 2).
The second aspect of H.R. 6 to be discussed is  the user charge.  The
legislation establishes  a .04 percent ad valorem tax.  This  tax is  a four
cent charge  levied on every $100 worth of freight value of commercial  cargo
loaded or unloaded at U.S. ports.  The  revenue raised from the user charges
will be put into a Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund.  The monies  from this
fund will be used to partially offset the Army Corps costs  of port and
channel operation and maintenance.  The user fee  is expected to  raise
about $120 million annually for port dredging and improvements.
There were many user fee schemes proposed before Congress  and other
port interests.  So why was an ad valorem tax implemented?  An ad valorem
tax was enacted because it  tends to favor small ports which are numerous
and have political influence.  Ad valorem fees  for larger ports on the
other hand tend to  overcharge liners  and containerships which ship high
value cargo, but do not need a channel depth level of 45 feet  or greater.
DEBATE ON THE USER FEE ISSUE AND THE SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL OF H.R. 6
The  interests  involved in the debate over H.R. 6 and the enactment of
a user fee were both numerous and diverse.  This section will briefly
discuss  the conflicting interests and some opponent/proponent viewpoints as
16to the user fee scheme.  An example of how one Congressional Committee
appointment and how the power leverage inherent in that Committee affected
H.R. 6 will follow.
The most general and divisive conflict of interests over  the
implementation of a user fee was between the ports.  Ports of differing
sizes and shipping patterns realized that one type of user fee  scheme would
cost them less than another.  The shippers of bulk commodities, categorized
by high volume,  low value cargo advocated the  ad valorem based tax whereas
high value, low tonnage shippers  sought a per ton tax.  Specific ports  such
as Duluth-Superior favored an ad valorem tax, while ports like New York
pushed a tonnage based charge.  Why?  Obviously the  differing commodity
flows through these  two ports provide an explanation.  Duluth-Superior
trade flows are primarily grain and coal exports from the Midwest and
Western states.  These commodities are low value, high tonnage.  Thus,  an
ad valorem tax on these commodities costs less  than a tonnage  tax.  The
situation is reversed for ports like New York which basically  ship high
value manufactured goods.  In those cases,  a tonnage based fee  is
preferred.
The coal industry  is an example of a group which effectively lobbied
Congress against  the  implementation of a user fee.  In fact, H.R. 6
indefinitely extended existing preferences to U.S.  carriers for  loading
coal involved in coastwise traffic.  Coal interests  represented by specific
coal companies and/or coal mining regions argued that a user fee would
further reduce the competitiveness of western coal relative  to eastern coal
in any waterborne Midwestern market, such as  Duluth-Superior.
17The Great Lakes ports were particularly concerned with the  type of
user fee system the Reagan Administration sought to  implement.  The Lake
Carriers' Association at a Maritime User Fees conference  in 1983 expressed
concerns over  the competitiveness of Great Lakes ports  in regards to other
transport modes if a user fee were to be implemented.  The president of the
Association, George T. Ryan, stated at the  conference  that the  "only
competition to  the water transport industry in shipping bulk raw materials
on Great Lakes ports  and inland waterways is  the railroads.  Despite this,
the government has not included railroads in the new user  tax plans"
(University of Minnesota Sea Grant Program Conference, 1983,  p. 28).  Thus,
one reason that groups such as the Lake Carriers' Association lobbied
against the user taxes  levied on the maritime industry was because the  only
other competitive transport mode serving the lakes states--the rail
industry--would not be taxed.
Labor groups also  reacted negatively to  the idea of port user fees.
Labor interests such as  the Seafarers International Union, the
International Longshoremen Association and the United Steelworkers of
America protested the enactment of a user fee plan.  These groups
maintained that any  increase  in transport costs  resulting from user fees
would manifest itself in diverted or  lost port traffic, decreased
employment levels and other adverse regional  economic effects.
H.R. 6 represents  in large part a compromise.  The  .04 percent ad
valorem tax is  relatively conservative considering the Reagan
Administration originally proposed a much higher level.  Furthermore, the
ad valorem user fee system  is very much a political compromise.  Smaller
ports  are more protected from trade diversions with an ad valorem tax
18instead of a tonnage based fee.  In this way, individual Congressional
representatives will not have to  deal with the eventual difficult
constituent questions when small, inefficient  (low volume) ports close as
the effects of user fees and market consequences become apparent.
However, a compromise resulting from a final consensus between House and
Senate was reached in part due to  last minute political maneuvering within
the Senate Finance Committee.  When the legislation cleared the House and
Senate Public Works Committee  in early october 1986,  it seemed headed
towards rapid approval.  However,  it was waylaid in the House Ways and
Means Committee.
The Chair of the House Ways  and Means  Committee was Dan Rostenkowski,
a Democrat from Illinois.  The Ways and Means Committee had pushed the
Senate Finance Committee to  approve of reconciliatory budget provisions.
As the Senate Finance Committee moved to negotiate and approve  the revenue
and tax issues  in H.R. 6, Rostenkowski as  Ways and Means Chair, refused to
relinquish control over  the bill without first moving on the overall budget
reconciliation.  Rostenkowski then used H.R. 6 as a bargaining chip.  Thus,
by controlling the Committee agenda, Rep. Rostenkowski forced the  Senate
Finance Committee to  accept an  increase in AFDC funding and the
construction of a $32  million post office in his home district in Chicago.
CONCLUSION
The passage  of the Waterways Resources Act of 1986 represents a
fundamental change in the way that U.S. ports and navigable channels are
financed and operated.  The political  atmosphere and economic  climate of
the early 1980's provided a favorable environment for the port user fee
issue to come  to  the forefront of U.S. waterway resources debate.  Note
19that port policy is not mentioned  in the prior statement.  The passage of
H.R. 6 was another attempt at formulating a better defined and more
equitable relationship between the Federal government and U.S.  ports.  Yet
the debate centered on cost-sharing formulas, user fee systems, and equity
and efficiency arguments, without ever formulating a definitive statement
of U.S. port policy.  No criteria or approval processes were established to
determine which ports will receive new funding and which projects  take
precedence over each other.  Thus:
"any new major port dredging will result from one of two
determinants:  (1) the ability of the individual port to
convince Congress  that its needs would receive first or highest
priority;  and (2) the ability of the individual port to  find and
secure non-federal funding sources"  (Marine Board, et al.,  1985,
P. 9).
What has actually changed with the passage  of the legislation?  The
Army Corps of Engineers will still be subject to pork-barrel  funding,
although possibly to a lesser extent than before.  Congressional approval
of new projects will still be subject to  implicit logrolling and sectional
favoritism.  The  federal funds  appropriated for operation and maintenance
services provided by the Corps may be decreased as  the revenues  from user
fees become available.  In addition, the requirement for cost sharing
imposes  financial compromise.  The port user fee scheme enacted by
Congress  is a compromise as  stated in the previous section.  This
compromise resulted in a user fee scheme which can neither meet complete
cost recovery nor economic efficiency.
Deep  draft ports are essential  to  the continued economic well-being of
the U.S.  However, current governmental  structure in place today is willing
to let U.S. port policy be determined as  a result of market consequences.
Issues such as port location, capacity and the  timing of deeper draft ports
20are too  important to be left completely to market forces.  A national
policy on port development  is still required.
H.R. 6 represents an undeniable turning point in the port and harbor
regulatory funding framework.  The structural shocks the legislation
unleashes will definitely cause changes in the status quo  and shifts  in the
long-term relationship between the Federal government and U.S. port
interests.  The extent  to which these changes will transform the U.S.
economy and transportation industry are yet to be seen.
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